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An Economic Analysis of Rebates Conditional on Positive Reviews

2020年12月30日 10:54  点击:[]

报告题目:An Economic Analysis of Rebates Conditional on Positive Reviews

时间:2020.12.31上11

会议地点腾讯会议(会议ID:369561440)

举办人:李文立

报告内容和摘要:

Abstract: Strategic sellers on some online selling platforms have recently been using a conditional-rebate strategy to manipulate product reviews under which only purchasing consumers who post positive reviews online are eligible to redeem the rebate. A key concern for the conditional rebate is that it can easily induce fake reviews which might be harmful to consumers and society. We develop a microbehavioral model capturing consumers' review-sharing benefit, review-posting cost, and moral cost of lying to examine the seller's optimal pricing and rebate decisions. We derive three equilibria: the no-rebate, authentic-review equilibrium, the low-rebate, boosted-review equilibrium, and the high-rebate, fake-review equilibrium. We find that the seller's optimal price and rebate decisions critically depend on both the review-posting and moral costs. The seller adopts the no-rebate strategy when the review-posting cost is low but the moral cost is high, the low-rebate strategy when the review-posting cost is high or when the review-posting cost is intermediate and the moral cost is high, and the high-rebate strategy when the review-posting cost is not too high and the moral cost is low. Our results suggest that it is not always profitable for strategic sellers to adopt the conditional-rebate strategy. Even if the conditional-rebate strategy is adopted, it does not always result in fake reviews. Furthermore, we find that, compared with the benchmark with no rebate, conditional rebates do not always hurt consumer surplus or social welfare. When a low (high) rebate is offered, if the review-posting cost is not too low (not very high), the conditional-rebate strategy can even lead to higher consumer surplus and social welfare. Our findings shed new light on the platform policy debate about the fake-review phenomenon induced by conditional rebates.

报告人简介:

 

 

陈建清教授为美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校Jinda商学院教授。研究领域集中于社交媒体和用户生成内容,搜索引擎广告,平台商业模式,供应链风险管理等。论文发表在营销领域、信息领域的国际顶级学术期刊,包括:Information SystemsResearch(ISR), MIS Quarterly, Management Science(MS), Journal of Marketing Research(JOR), Journal of Marketing, Production and Operations Management(POM), Journal of Management Information Systems, Economics Letters, Decision Analysis, Decision Support Systems(DSS)等,隶属于UTD24种期刊。目前担任Information Systems Research, Journal of Electronic Commerce Research等国际期刊副主编,在相关领域具有较高的学术声誉。2016年,陈教授获得了INFORMS杰出青年奖,是获得此奖的惟一华人。

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